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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre 
for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out 
research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is 
exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a 
broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide the full documentation 
of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to 
analyse the processes through which such impacts occur and the circumstances which 
exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and 
concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government 
agencies. 
 
This report on Southern Sudan is one of 13 case studies (all of which can be found at 
www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data sources, including 
existing research studies, reports and evaluations commissioned by operational agencies, 
and early warning and survey data where this has been available. These secondary 
sources have been complemented by interviews with government officers, aid 
policymakers and practitioners, researchers and members of the local population. The 
analysis and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the views or policy of DFID or the UK government. 
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Executive summary 
 
This southern Sudan case study documents the impact of armed violence during 
prolonged civil war whose ongoing second phase began in 1983. There are two conflicts 
in southern Sudan. One conflict, the greater war, is north-south, between the Government 
of Sudan (GoS) and the southern opposition primarily led by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Another is south-south, between factions of the 
southern rebel movement who have fought each other for leadership of the southern 
cause and for control over territory and access to resources. The GoS has fuelled the 
south-south conflict through its chillingly effective strategy of counter-insurgency. The 
GoS has supported southern and Arab militias, not least with weapons, in order to fight 
the war “by proxy”. Both sides have armed the population of southern Sudan. Civilians 
have been deliberately targeted in the war, with the widespread destruction of assets and 
of livelihoods. This has had a hugely impoverishing effect on a population of over seven 
million.  
 
This case study focuses on three areas of southern Sudan to demonstrate the differential 
impact of armed violence. The first is Bahr el Ghazal, particularly the Lakes sub-region. 
Bahr el Ghazal has mostly suffered from north-south conflict, although there has been 
politicized inter-ethnic fighting between the Nuer and Dinka tribes since 1991. The SPLA 
has provided rudimentary governance. In comparison, Upper Nile, the second area, has 
suffered from much more severe inter-ethnic/ inter-factional fighting and a scorched earth 
policy by the GoS in the oil-producing areas. There is virtually no system of governance. 
It is one of the worst-affected parts of southern Sudan, and recovery has been much 
slower than elsewhere since the cessation of hostilities over two years ago. This case 
study also looks at the area covered by the 1999 Wunlit peace agreement, the third area, 
to learn lessons from that important local-level initiative. These comparisons underline 
how important it is to understand the underlying dynamics of conflict in order to 
understand the specific impact of armed violence. 
 
Local people assess the risk of violence from southern and Arab militias as greater than 
the risk of conventional warfare between the GoS and rebel movements. Some of the 
militias that have been armed – particularly the Arab murahilin – have been driven by 
economic interest (or greed). The southern militias have been driven more by local and 
tribal grievances and by cattle raiding. All the militias have been rewarded by the seizure 
of assets from their looting, including livestock and people; a thriving slave trade has 
developed, afflicting large numbers of women and children.  
 
In the words of one chief, “nowadays everyone has a gun”.  For the majority of the 
population their motive for being armed is protection against this destructive form of 
counter-insurgency warfare, and in the absence of either the GoS or the rebel movements 
providing or maintaining security. For some, especially young men, the motive has 
transformed into an offensive one as the barrel of the gun became the easiest way to 
accumulate wealth (usually through livestock) and to assert control over scarce resources. 
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Years of war and the proliferation of small arms has led to the breakdown of traditional 
conflict resolution mechanisms. Killing, particularly of women and children, is no longer 
taboo. This shift in attitude is particularly associated with the years after the split in the 
SPLA in 1991 when inter- and intra-ethnic fighting escalated. Social capital has been 
both a casualty and perpetrator of conflict. One of the consequences of the counter-
insurgency tactics has been the breakdown of traditional agreements and relationships 
between different ethnic groups that may previously have shared resources, enjoyed 
relationships of exchange and even inter-married. The backing and arming of certain 
groups has caused them to turn their guns against each other and has fuelled power 
struggles over natural resources such as grazing land. At the same time as groups have 
segregated, they have turned inwards for protection.  
 
Two decades of civil war in southern Sudan have resulted in huge loss of life. In the field 
work for this case study, every interviewee from the Lakes and Upper Nile Regions 
recounted tales of loss of family members and of looted livestock. Abductions have had a 
similarly debilitating and traumatising impact. Slave raiding has been perpetrated by 
government-backed militia as a tool of war to terrorize the population. Women and 
children were abducted as forced labour or as a commodity to be traded in the north. The 
scale is disputed and unknown, but is substantial; some NGOs reckon up to 200,000 
people have been enslaved.  
 
War has also caused widespread displacement. Sudan now has more internally displaced 
people (IDPs) than any other country in the world. Displacement may be seasonal, often 
during the dry season during the critical periods of planting and harvesting. For some, it 
has been a more or less continual state over many years. Fleeing from place to place 
makes it very difficult to re-establish livelihoods and to recover. IDPs are very vulnerable 
to banditry along the roads. When some have been able to return, especially after a long 
period, it is to find that their land has now been taken over and occupied by the SPLA. 
Whilst some host communities have absorbed IDPs well, in other areas it has fuelled 
tension, even conflict, where there has been competition for scarce resources. IDPs in 
northern Sudan have been exploited as a cheap and readily available source of labour. 
 
War has had a devastating impact on livestock, the mainstay of the pastoralist and agro-
pastoralist economies of the Lakes sub-region and Upper Nile, mainly through looting. In 
parts of Bahr el Ghazal, it was estimated that 40% of households lost all their cattle. 
Insecurity has limited access to vital grazing areas in the dry season to water points and to 
major markets only to further deplete livestock herds. Lack of milk is a major loss of 
sustenance during the “hunger gap”, especially for young children. Crop production has 
also been depressed by war-related violence through the destruction of crops and the 
displacement of labour. Fear of attack meant that some communities stopped cultivating.  
 
The asset-stripping nature of the war has meant that the better-off are often more 
vulnerable to attack. This has a knock-on effect on poorer households if they can no 
longer rely on wealthier relatives for support or for labour. Displacement has also 
destroyed kinship support as families fleeing from conflict have become more spread out 
over large areas. 
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The war has been especially hard on Sudanese women. They now outnumber men by a 
significant margin, which means they must carry the burden of supporting all dependents. 
This involves a hugely increased workload. Yet, they do not have land rights. Widow-
headed households have become some of the poorest in the region. In Yirol County, they 
represent 20-30% of the “poorest” category of households and 15-25% of the “poor” 
category. 
 
One of the most devastating cases of the destruction of livelihoods, displacement and 
impoverishment on an appalling scale has happened in the areas surrounding the oil fields 
in western Upper Nile, as a result of the GoS’s scorched earth policy. The policy was 
intended to ensure that no one would ever return home so that oil exploration could 
proceed ‘unhindered’. 
 
At the meso level, the war has had a devastating impact on social infrastructure. Several 
generations have grown up with little or no access to formal education causing a knock-
on lack of professional human capacity to build governance and the judiciary system, for 
example. For years, in SPLA areas, development objectives were subordinated to military 
objectives. High and unregulated taxation to support the SPLA war effort was a further 
drain on already depleted household resources. Trade and exchange routes and 
relationships have also been disrupted by conflict, which can severely compromise 
coping strategies in times of stress when pastoralists would normally sell livestock to buy 
food and non-food items. Access to humanitarian relief, a life-saving resource for many, 
is unpredictable and frequently severed in the areas of greatest fighting. Insecurity has 
caused agencies to withdraw, sometimes when they are needed most, and denial of access 
has been a tool of war used with fatal consequences by the GoS. 
 
This was never more evident than in the run-up to the Bahr el Ghazal famine in 1998. 
Asset depletion through looting (particularly by the destructive activities of warlord 
Kerubino), SPLA attacks on towns causing massive displacement, and denial of access of 
humanitarian agencies by the GoS caused appalling famine marked by some of the 
highest mortality rates ever recorded. Within one decade there have been at least three 
serious famines in southern Sudan, all conflict-related, symbolising the most extreme 
form of impoverishment and death. 
 
The cost of the civil war on livelihoods in southern Sudan is attributed more to the 
destructive activities of southern militias than it is to direct attacks by the GoS army. As a 
result, areas of southern Sudan controlled by the SPLA have some of the worst human 
development indicators in the world, which are substantially lower than other parts of 
Sudan. For example, gross national income per capita is estimated to be less than $90 per 
year, about four times lower than income per capita in the rest of the country. Meanwhile, 
some have grown rich through a war economy that has flourished in the last two decades 
– warlords, government officials and politicians and some SPLA leaders. They have 
benefited from looting and other predatory means of acquiring assets. 
 
The 1999 Wunlit Peace Covenant effectively ended seven and a half years of politicized 
inter-tribal fighting between the Dinka and the Nuer, which throws up some important 
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lessons. It shows the importance of restoring trust in society to re-establish security and 
to mitigate the impoverishing impact of war, particularly destructive asset-stripping. 
However, the Wunlit experience also shows that communities can relapse into conflict 
when the underlying causes are not addressed, including external political influence, 
weak governance and rule of law.  
Recovery programming must be integrated, combining investment in development – for 
example, in water, health and education – with investment in governance – for example, 
in the police, judiciary and protection. Failure to address the latter will almost certainly 
result in a waste of resources in the former. Yet, there is no point in disarming before 
security is guaranteed and before local people trust the governance systems. Currently, 
the possession of weapons is regarded as an essential part of people’s livelihood 
strategies to protect themselves.  
 
In the short term, the international community must do all it can to support the peace 
agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A, including advocacy to end militia activity. It 
must also support local-level people-to-people peace processes. In the longer term, the 
international community must invest in governance and strengthening the rule of law. 
Disarmament plans must be linked to longer-term rehabilitation and recovery only when 
sufficient trust has been built between local people and properly functioning governance 
systems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This case study of southern Sudan has been led by Pact Kenya, through a combination of 
field and desk research. The field research took place from 11 July to 6 August 2004, 
mainly in the Lakes sub-region of Bahr el Ghazal (in Yirol Town, Pankar village and 
Rumbek County), in Ayod County in Upper Nile and in Nairobi, Kenya. It took the form 
of group interviews, personal testimonies and observation. The interviews and personal 
testimonies were particularly valuable in documenting the psycho-social impact of the 
war and how perceptions of security have changed over time to lead to differing behavior 
patterns. A list of key informants interviewed in Nairobi for this study is attached as 
Annex 1. 
 
The southern Sudan case study documents the impact of armed violence during the 
prolonged Sudanese civil war1. It began as conventional warfare in 1983 between the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) and the southern opposition primarily led by the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Very soon a new dimension developed, 
south-south conflict between factions of the southern rebel movement, which started to 
fight each other for leadership of the southern cause and control over territory and access 
to resources. Throughout this period, the arming of the population of southern Sudan has 
been widespread and indeed been a key strategy in how the war has been fought. The 
fuelling of the south-south conflict is a direct result of the GoS’s chillingly effective 
strategy of counter-insurgency. No household is untouched by the war and its violence. 
Interviews carried out in southern Sudan for this study reveal just how badly the war has 
devastated institutions such as traditional authority, governance and rule of law. The 
violence has deliberately targeted civilians, their assets and livelihoods, resulting in high 
food insecurity, widespread displacement and death. Although the level of exposure to 
the different types of conflict has had differing impacts on assets, livelihoods and social 
relationships, it has had a hugely impoverishing effect on this vast area of Sudan, 
affecting a population of over seven million.  
 
At the time of writing, Southern Sudan is on the brink of peace, propelled by recent 
breakthroughs in the peace talks between the northern government and the SPLM/A. 
Indeed, most of the south has enjoyed a cessation in hostilities for over two years due to a 
ceasefire between the two sides. There is already evidence of recovery, but this is still 
fragile, which reflects the fragility of the peace process itself. 
 
This case study focuses on three areas of southern Sudan: Bahr el Ghazal, particularly the 
Lakes sub-region, Upper Nile Region, and areas covered by the 1999 Wunlit peace 
agreement parts of which overlap with Lakes and Upper Nile. See Annex 2 for the 
respective maps. The reason for choosing these different areas is to understand the 
differential impact the war and armed violence has had. The Lakes sub-region has mostly 
suffered from the north-south civil war between the GoS and SPLA. There has been 
                                                 
1 This case study covers the second phase of civil war in southern Sudan. The first phase started in 1955 and continued 
until the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972. The second civil war began in 1981 and became organised in 1983 
when the rebel movement – the SPLA – was formed (Deng, 2003) 
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politicized inter-ethnic fighting between the Nuer and Dinka tribes since 1991, but to a 
lesser extent than in some other parts of southern Sudan. Thus, recovery in the Lakes sub-
region has been much faster since the cessation of hostilities than in the second region 
covered by this case study, Upper Nile. This region has been one of the worst-affected 
parts of southern Sudan as a direct result of the greater war and because it has become a 
microcosm of that war. It has suffered from many different conflict dynamics, including 
severe inter-factional fighting and a scorched earth policy by the GoS in the oil-
producing areas. There has been much less sign of recovery since the official cessation of 
hostilities. Hence violent inter and intra-ethnic fighting has continued in the almost total 
absence of governance. Table 1 shows the similarities and differences between the Lakes 
sub-region and Upper Nile. Common to both, however, has been the proliferation of 
weapons into society. 
 
Table 1. Similarities and differences between the Lakes sub-region of Bahr 
El Ghazal and Upper Nile 
Characteristics Lakes sub-region, BEG Upper Nile 
Area 
 
Six counties in eastern 
BEG: Rumbek, Yirol, 
Awerial, Cuiebet and Tonj 
Three sub-regions of 
Western, Southern & 
Eastern Upper Nile 
Ethnicity Mainly Dinka (a range of 
sub clans); some other 
ethnic groups 
Multi-ethnic, including 
Nuer, Dinka, Murle, 
Toposa, Kichipo, most with 
a range of sub-clans 
Main livelihood system Mainly agro-pastoralism Mainly agro-pastoralism 
Primary conflict GoS-SPLA civil war GoS-SPLA civil war; GoS 
against local communities 
surrounding oil fields; GoS-
backed militia against 
SPLA and local 
communities; Nuer-Dinka 
politicized ethnic clashes; 
politicized and non-
politicized inter- and intra-
ethnic clashes over 
resources; local armed 
violence by civilians 
Additional conflicts Nuer-Dinka politicized 
ethnic clashes; local armed 
violence by civilians 
 
Nature of armed violence GoS aerial bombardment; 
physical fighting between 
GoS & SPLA troops; 
banditry; cattle raiding; 
looting; raping women; 
burning villages 
GoS aerial bombardment; 
inter- and intra-factional 
fighting; banditry; cattle 
raiding; looting; raping 
women; burning villages; 
abducting & selling women 
& children 
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2. The context of armed violence 
2.1 The underlying conflict dynamics 
 
As explained above, there are two conflicts in southern Sudan: north-south and south-
south. Initially, the war was fought by the GoS through aerial bombardment and 
helicopter gunships and through physical fighting between GoS and SPLA soldiers. In 
the mid-1980s, however, the GoS began supporting Arab pastoralist groups, which 
included arming them. They became known as the murahalin2 and were encouraged to 
attack Dinka and Nuer pastoralists in SPLA-areas of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. The 
murahalin became the first part of a two-pronged GoS strategy to co-opt groups to wage 
a war by proxy in the south. Similar to GoS troops, the murahalin raided cattle and looted 
and burned villages; the spoils of these raids served as a major financial incentive for 
continuing the war. By the late 1980s, GoS support for these militias was regularized as 
they were transformed into the paramilitary Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a parallel 
army made up of the murahalin. The Army used the PDF in joint operations against the 
SPLA and civilian targets and to protect trains carrying supplies for Bahr el Ghazal 
garrison towns (Prendergast, 2002). The PDF militia was generally financed by looting 
and the slave trade. This government strategy has taken a devastating toll on Bahr el 
Ghazal and Upper Nile.  Thousands have been killed or enslaved and hundreds of 
thousands more displaced across both southern and northern Sudan.  
 
In 1991 a split occurred in the SPLM/A. Commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol had a 
falling out with John Garang over the leadership and direction of the SPLM/A. Riek and 
Lam split off to form the SPLA-United, which was made up of mostly Nuer and Shilluk 
forces in Upper Nile. This split set Nuer and Shilluk tribes against the primarily Dinka 
supporters of Garang’s SPLM/A. The split set southerner against southerner and 
intensified the war on the southern front. The impact of these intensified Nuer-Dinka 
clashes was particularly severe in Upper Nile. 
  
This south-south conflict represents the other side of the two-pronged GoS strategy to co-
opt groups to wage a war by proxy in the south. The GoS took advantage of the split 
within the SPLM/A to supply Nuer and Shilluk factions with weapons to fight the 
SPLM/A. The GoS went on to arm other individual factions, Dinka and Nuer, to wage 
war against the SPLM/A, other southern factions that opposed the GoS and civilians in 
areas around the oil fields. This policy resulted in violent inter- and intra-ethnic clashes, 
in-fighting among southern rebel groups and widespread displacement. The GoS strategy 
of divide and conquer served two objectives: first, to divert southern attention away from 
the north and second, to help clear the way for oil exploration and extraction. The latter is 
illustrative of how GOS (and SPLA) counterinsurgency sometimes worked. It was not 
only about political power and control, there were also strong economic motivations. 
                                                 
2 The murahalin, or mobile forces, are recruited from the Baggara tribes of Southern Kordofan, Southern Darfur, 
Western and Southern Gezira, Northern Upper Nile and Northern and North-Western Bahr el Ghazal (Alier 2003). The 
Baggara have traditionally migrated to the south during the dry season to graze and water cattle. In the past, agreements 
with southern tribes gave the Baggara access to these resources. However, relations between the two groups 
degenerated toward the beginning of the war and even more when GoS policy shifted to arming the murahalin against 
the Dinka and Nuer. 
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These have been well-documented (see, for example, Keen, 1997 and Duffield, 2001), 
with serious knock-on effects on poverty. 
 
The north-south and south-south conflicts have more recently spilled over into intense 
localized armed conflict especially in Upper Nile. This has taken on the forms of 
banditry, more deadly cattle raiding, looting property, burning villages, raping women, 
and disputes in which people more frequently resort to guns instead of relying on the 
intervention of traditional authorities.  
2.2 The significance of small arms and light weapons 
 
Weapons proliferated into civilian hands during the war as the GoS and the southern 
militias armed the population to fight the opposition, i.e., their opponents, the GoS, SPLA 
or other southern militias, depending on the case. The effect of forming and arming the 
murahalin militias became particularly evident in Bahr el Ghazal from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Africa Watch (1990) documents how the GoS provided arms, ammunition, 
intelligence and effective immunity from prosecution. The most devastating raids of the 
murahalin occurred in Bahr el Ghazal in 1986/ 87. Over 1000 displaced Dinka were 
brutally massacred by the murahalin in Ad-Daien in western Sudan in 1987 (Deng, 
2003). The creation of these militias and the provision of arms had the effect of severing 
relations between different ethnic groups – in this case between the Baggara and the 
Dinka/ Nuer – that traditionally had agreements about access to grazing and water 
resources.  
 
The forming and arming of southern militias by the GoS and by the southern opposition 
have had a similarly devastating impact particularly since the split in the SPLA in 1991. 
Whereas the murahalin militias are driven by economic interest and marginalization in 
the north, the southern militias are driven by local and tribal grievances and cattle raiding 
(Deng, 2003). As a result: 
“waves of attacks [were launched] on entire Dinka communities in Upper Nile, 
which resulted in a horrific devastation of lives and livelihoods, never before 
experienced in the history of tribal conflict in southern Sudan”. 
(Deng, 2003: 125) 
 
Interestingly, Deng’s survey work in Bahr el Ghazal (2003) reveals that households’ 
perceived Dinka militias and Arab militias as the main sources of risk that they faced (as 
well as drought). In contrast, conventional warfare between the GoS and the southern 
rebel movements did not feature as a particularly important source of risk.  
 
Not only were the militias deliberately armed by the GoS and rebel movements, but also 
in turn, the militias armed the local population. This was the case in Eastern Upper Nile 
from the mid-1990s when inter- and intra-ethnic conflict was raging. The militias freely 
distributed firearms and ammunition to arm local people against other clans and tribes. 
Also, small arms easily fell into civilian hands as soldiers deserted from the army and 
melted back into civilian society, while taking their weapons with them. In the words of 
Chief Chep Akuch from Pagarau, in the Lakes sub-region: “nowadays, everyone has a 
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gun”. An informal poll conducted in Eastern Upper Nile, among the Gawaar of Ayod 
County, indicated that the percentage of men carrying small arms among the Gawaar 
community exceeded 70%. Individuals as young as 13 possessed guns.3  
 
There are several motivations for holding a gun. The motivation for the majority of 
people is protection. In response to the Sudanese government’s counter-insurgency 
warfare and in the absence of either the GoS or rebel movements providing and 
maintaining security, the population took protection into their own hands, which meant 
being armed. This pattern is typical amongst pastoralists in East Africa’s peripheral areas 
where government administration and the rule of law are weak. This is borne out in the 
northern Kenya case study (Buchanan-Smith and Lind, 2004). It is simply more extreme 
in the context of civil war where violence is more widespread and more intense. Indeed, 
even in the current “post-conflict phase”, guns are still widely held and depended upon 
for protection. 
 
For some, protection soon became offensive. For example, the White Army4 in Upper 
Nile, an informal gang of armed young men, was originally created to protect herds 
during the dry season. Armed with modern weapons, the White Army soon began to 
expand traditional rivalries with other groups to terrifying proportions. Nyuon Nen 
Nyuen explained that these men started to engage in everything from hunting to banditry, 
looting, cattle raiding and eloping with women without paying the proper dowry, or 
paying as little as three to five cows instead of the usual 25 to 30.5 The White Army even 
took to forcefully collecting food from the community. Similarly, other rival groups have 
armed to assert control over scarce resources, while many people have simply armed to 
protect themselves from these armed groups. 
 
For young men, the barrel of the gun has enabled them to accrue wealth in a war 
environment where options were extremely limited. Cattle raiding and looting have 
become the easiest means of accumulating a herd, which is essential for paying the bride 
price in order to get married. It has also become a way to gain power over people and 
resources. 
 
A vicious cycle is created whereby the increased availability of arms in civilian hands has 
fuelled widespread lawlessness and disorder, which are possible because of weak 
governance systems and a culture of impunity. Local conflicts can quickly spiral out of 
control and thieves and looters can commit crimes without an effective deterrent. Even 
after the war, arms have continued to spread into civil society as families arm to protect 
themselves and their assets against bandits and as gangs continue to arm to compete with 
rival groups for wealth and fame.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Conversation with James Duoth Joak, Ayod County, 27 July 2004 
4 The name White Army was given to this group of armed civilians to distinguish them from the regular armed services 
and other militia. The term ‘white’ is a reference to their lack of identification as a real army, for example, they do not 
have uniforms 
5 Conversation with Nyuon Nen Nyuen, Ayod County, 26 July 2004 
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3. Social and cultural aspects of armed violence 
3.1 Cultural aspects 
 
Traditional weapons, such as the spear, club or stick, would always have been seen as 
symbols of juvenile masculinity. As the availability of weapons increased, the social 
significance of guns has simply overtaken these traditional weapons. 
 
Before the war, killing was taboo among both the Dinka and Nuer tribes, and those who 
committed it were required to undergo rituals of penance.  If a Dinka killed another 
person he was required to sacrifice a bull or goat and jump over it to cleanse himself of 
the act. If a Nuer killed another person he had to be bled.  A spiritual leader would use a 
fishing spear to draw blood from his right shoulder as a symbol of drawing the blood of 
the slain person. Then he would sacrifice an animal (NSCC, 2000).  The proliferation of 
small arms in society and the destruction of war have led to the breakdown of these 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that required compensation for the taking of a 
life. Instead, young men recruited by the warring factions were taught to kill without 
restraint, negating the ethical constraints of social and spiritual risks associated with 
killing (NSCC, 2002). There were no longer taboos around the killing of women and 
children and the abduction of children became a lucrative trade. This change in attitude 
appears to have been particularly marked after the 1991 split in the SPLA. In the words 
of Deng Mading, a Community Development Officer for Pact: 
It was as if people lost the spirit of humanity. The cycle of war made people more 
brutal. People began taking revenge in a different way. To get back at me 
someone might come and kill my sister to anger and humiliate me. People also 
saw the Arabs doing things like this to women. 
3.2  Social capital and armed violence 
 
One of the most striking features of how the civil war in southern Sudan has been fought 
has been the use of counter-insurgency tactics by both sides. As a result, neighbouring 
tribes and individuals turned guns against each other to amass wealth and fame. In the 
words of Chief Top Tut Nyial in a peace conference, which aimed to quell the conflicts 
among all of the tribes in Southern Upper Nile, “the weapons acquired were for fighting 
the Arabs, but unfortunately, we turned them to ourselves.”6 Thus, social capital has been 
both a casualty and perpetrator of conflict. 
 
Relationships and negotiated agreements between groups rapidly broke down, which also 
affected how they perceived each other. For example, in Southern Upper Nile, the Dinka 
and Nuer came to be perceived by their neighbours as power-hungry groups that 
oppressed minorities. The Murle were perceived as “hostile, aggressive and backward.” 
The Toposa and Kachipo were perceived as having a culture that encouraged killing for 
fame and respect and the Anyuak were perceived by their neighbours as trying to 
                                                 
6 Pact/SPF, Planning and Organization Pibor Development Association (PDA), Mediation & Secretariat Presbyterian 
Church f the Sudan, Pibor Parish (PCOS, PP)  Murle Reconciliatory Peace Conference Resolutions and 
Recommendations, 14-17 December 2003. 
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dominate resources by claiming that all resources belong to them.7 Moreover, previously 
the Dinka and Murle were reported to have had an adoption agreement, whereby the 
Murle, plagued by infertility, could adopt Dinka children. During the war this practice 
broke down and evolved into forced abduction and commercial transactions in the sale 
and buying of children. Abductions were also carried out by families as revenge for cattle 
raiding. Due to the economic incentive, forced abductions became a growing, lucrative 
criminal trade and another underlying perpetuator of conflict in the region. 
 
Another example of the breakdown of relations is provided by the Agar and Apak 
between Yirol and Rumbek Counties in the Lakes sub-region. The Agar and Apak have 
traditionally had friendly relations, enjoying intermarriage and exchange relationships. In 
many villages lying on the borders between the two peoples, such as those along the 
Cuibet-Rumbek border, the Agar and Apak lived together. However, as conflict erupted, 
cattle raiding, looting, burning and incidents of rape caused the two groups to pull apart. 
The Agar people fled their villages to move closer to their people in Rumbek for added 
protection. The Apak people moved to Agany village to become closer to their people. 
Thus, social capital between the Agar and Apak, in the form of their close-knit 
relationship, fell victim to the conflict as relations were severed and the two groups 
separated. There are now empty villages along the Cuibet-Rumbek border where the 
Agar and Apak once lived together.  
 
On the one hand, GoS backing and arming of certain groups caused them to turn their 
guns against each other. On the other hand, conflict has caused groups to segregate and 
look inward for protection. 
 
This, in turn, has fuelled violent local-level power struggles over natural resources. In the 
Lakes Region, for instance, these have turned increasingly deadly as groups have asserted 
their control over coveted grazing areas by attempting to rename cattle camps. In Tonj 
East County, the Pakam renamed areas as they moved into Jalwua territory only to fuel 
conflict between the two groups.  Similar conflicts erupted between the Gok and Agar in 
Mvolo County and pastoralists (Beil, Agar, Reel, and Gok) from Rumbek, Cuibet and 
Yirol counties, as pastoralists attempted to rename areas in which they grazed their cattle.  
 
However, not all areas of southern Sudan are unstable. Social capital in the form of 
women and youth groups, religious groups, trade and agriculture associations, parent-
teacher associations, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) does exist to varying degrees all over the region. The presence of 
relative security has helped these organizations to develop and grow. In Rumbek, for 
example, the establishment of security has allowed for the rise of civil society 
institutions. The SPLM/A took Rumbek in 1997 after intense fighting with the GoS. The 
restoration of peace in Rumbek led to the gradual increase of civil society. The Sudan 
Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA, now SRRC), the SPLM/A’s body for relief 
and coordination of the activities of indigenous and international organizations, was 
established in Rumbek in 1998. The UN’s World Food Program arrived in that same year 
                                                 
7 Murle Peace Committee, Boma Civil Administration, Pibor Development Association, “Jonglei Inter-Ethnic Peace & 
Reconciliation Conference Murle Led Peace Initiative,” 20-23 February 2004. 
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to respond to the famine that followed the fighting. Each ensuing year has seen the arrival 
of more traders and civil society organisations. This is a slow but valuable process that 
must be nurtured during the recovery phase. 
 
4. The breakdown of governance and the rule of law 
 
Before the war, traditional authorities in southern Sudan were responsible for managing 
community affairs. Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms included bringing people 
together for dialogue and administering justice by determining adequate compensation to 
resolve conflicts within and between communities. As the war continued and the 
SPLM/A took over civil administration, the power of traditional authorities was gradually 
undermined.  
 
In the 1980s, the SPLA made considerable efforts to expand the role of chiefs’ courts in 
settling inter-tribal disputes throughout the areas they oversaw, but chiefs were still 
highly controlled. While electing chiefs, the SPLA co-opted some of the more prominent 
personalities among them and carefully influenced the selection of others to secure 
positions for their supporters and allies (Johnson, 2003). Despite retaining nominal 
authority, chiefs were subordinated to the military chain of command and increasingly 
lost power to military authorities. Governance under the SPLM/A authority was carried 
out in a highly centralized militaristic fashion with little attention to the principles of 
fairness and consensus. The justice system was known for harsh and arbitrary 
interventions with little accountability.  
 
Today, corruption permeates the system as civil authorities either work on a voluntary 
basis or if paid receive very meager salaries. With little accountability to higher 
authorities, offering and accepting bribes has become commonplace and acknowledged 
as the only way to get anything done. The undermining of governance institutions by way 
of corruption and neglect and the simultaneous supplanting of traditional authority have 
left people in the south with little confidence in the system, particularly the 
administration of justice. “It’s as if truth and justice have been wrapped up in a ball and 
hung just out of reach,” laments one Dinka woman from Rumbek.8
 
Meanwhile, tit-for-tat raiding escalates when authorities leave such cases unresolved. 
Unresolved cases eventually fester and boil over into violent conflict. As Chief Abai 
noted9, outstanding cases have convinced the aggrieved to seek their own justice in the 
absence of the rule of law. Groups undertake revenge killings and looting of cattle, which 
leads to rapid escalations in the scale of the conflict and its levels of violence.  
 
Continued failure to establish governance and systems of justice, even after the cessation 
of hostilities, means that local level conflict persists and in some cases has escalated. See 
Section 7.1. 
 
                                                 
8 Conversation with Rhoda Adel, Rumbek County, 24 July 2004. 
9 Conversation with Chief Dhei Abai, Yirol County, BEG, 21 July 2004. 
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5. The political economy of violence 
 
A certain amount has been written about the greed versus grievance motivations in 
Sudan’s long-running civil war.10 Deng (2003) shows how the two interact: 
While the Arab militias were mainly motivated by need (drought and famine) and 
greed (restocking and cattle trade), the Dinka militias were mainly motivated by 
psychological pay-offs (revenge and vengeance), fear (SPLA soldiers joining for 
security) and greed (quick acquisition of wealth) (ibid: 128) 
 
He claims that counter-insurgency warfare legitimised greed in the 1980s and 1990s with 
assets being seized on a large-scale, e.g., Dinka livestock from northern Bahr el Ghazal 
taken by Arab militias and by Dinka and Nuer militias. What is particularly striking is 
how the looting and transfer of assets became systematized over years and decades. This 
was the way in which militias were rewarded especially through livestock and people. A 
thriving slave trade developed, which afflicted large numbers of women and children (see 
section 6.2 below). 
 
As noted above, weak governance and an absence of accountability breed corruption. 
Soon this becomes institutionalised and part of the political economy of war. For 
example, in the Lakes sub-region, the police and judiciary are sometimes perceived as 
being only interested in money. Judges have even been known to collect fines without 
settling cases. The SPLM County Secretary for Tonj East believes that the conflict in his 
area is partially caused by the self-interested practices of the judiciary and civil 
authorities. The Agar Pakam allegedly stole cattle, raided, looted property and took 
control of lands belonging to the Jalwau. Instead of resolving the conflict, judges “just go 
and take the cattle without giving a solution to the problem.”11 In other cases, criminals 
are not arrested or are allowed to bribe their way out of jail.  
 
The fragmentation of southern rebel movements spawned a form of warlordism of which 
Kerubino Kuanyin Bol was one of the most destructive. He was the government-backed 
rebel leader of the South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM) and led Dinka militia in 
northern Bahr el Ghazal to attack their own communities. He particularly targeted areas 
that produced food, held stocks and livestock or had recently received food aid deliveries 
(Deng, 2003). This widespread looting and destruction had a devastating impact on 
livelihoods. It was one of the contributory factors creating the Bahr el Ghazal famine of 
1998 (see section 6.5 below), rendering large numbers of people extremely vulnerable or 
destitute. 
 
Thus, in a context of long-running civil war and weak governance, a predatory political 
economy became established. Certain groups and individuals – for example government 
officials, politicians, warlords and some SPLA leaders – have benefited and grown rich 
from the transfer of assets by force and violence, from illegal exploitation of natural 
resources (gold, ivory and timber), and from profiteering from the high prices of essential 
goods in garrison towns (Keen, 1997). 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Keen, 2000. 
11 SPLM County Secretary for Tonj South, Pankar Peace Meeting, Rumbek 8-10 May 2004. 
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6. The impact of armed violence on poverty 
 
Regardless of the root causes and forms of the conflict, civilians have suffered the most 
in Sudan’s civil war as the violence has targeted their economic base. Perpetrators of the 
conflict have raided cattle, disrupted planting seasons, torched crops, looted grain stocks 
and killed family members. Not only has this been very destructive of livelihoods, it has 
had a very negative effect on coping strategies. Thus, families have become increasingly 
impoverished and increasingly vulnerable in the face of external shocks. 
 
After two decades of war, the processes by which this has happened are well-documented 
and are presented below. It is hard to quantify the impoverishing impact, but the figures 
that do exist show just how widespread and substantial the devastation and 
impoverishment have been. It seems hardly necessary to quantify much further. 
6.1 Micro level  
 
“People are losing their livelihoods and prosperity.” Commander Salva Kiir Mayardit, 
SPLM First Vice Chairman and Chief of Staff of the SPLA  
 
a) Loss of life and abduction 
 
Two decades of civil war in southern Sudan have resulted in huge loss of life sometimes 
through horrific massacres. As the ferocity of the war intensified after the 1991 split in 
the SPLA, Deng records some of the appalling killings that resulted. In the Bor area of 
Bahr El Ghazal (the home area of the SPLA leader), it is estimated that more than 5000 
people, mainly women and children, were massacred in a horrific manner. Others were 
displaced. Dinka communities in Upper Nile Region experienced similar attacks by the 
South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) forces after the 1991 split, 
resulting in massive loss of life and displacement. 
 
In the field work for this case study, every interviewee from the Lakes Region recounted 
tales of loss, enumerating the number of family members dead and cattle stolen. Awut 
Acuil, a representative of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) for Bahr el 
Ghazal, said that her family abandoned everything during the war and had to flee to 
Kenya. She is separated from her husband’s family, which is widely scattered.12 Achol, a 
women’s leader from Yirol County, has lost two sons and three stepsons in the conflict.13 
Elizabeth Yar Malek, from Bor, lost five children in one day. Three more of her children 
were taken to be soldiers; she does not know where they were stationed or if they are 
even still alive. 14  Helena Yak Marin, from Yirol County, described how her husband, a 
chief and soldier in Anyanya I, was targeted and killed by GoS soldiers.15 David Deng, 
who was part of the SPLM/A negotiating team in Naivasha, Kenya, lost three brothers 
(one of whom was a chief) and six nephews to the war. In total, he has lost over 20 
                                                 
12 Conversation with Awut Acuil, Women’s Leader/Pact Program Officer, Yirol County, 19 July 2004. 
13 Conversation with Achol, Women’s leader, Yirol County, 21 July 2004. 
14 Conversation with Elizabeth Yar Malek, Yirol County, 21 July 2004. 
15 Conversation with Helena Yak Marin, Yirol County 21 July 2004. 
 15
Armed violence and poverty in Southern Sudan, Burns Mackenzie & Buchanan-Smith, March 2004  
family members. David’s house and flour mill in Rumbek were also destroyed.16 These 
are just some of the many stories of the direct and devastating impact of this violent war 
on individuals and on families. 
 
Abductions have had a similarly debilitating and traumatising impact. Whilst abduction 
and slave-raiding are not new to Sudan17, it has intensified in scale and has somehow 
been “legitimized” by the conditions of war. Women and children have been abducted for 
forced labor or as a commodity to be traded in the north like animals. They have suffered 
horrifying forms of abuse, including sexual abuse (Fitzgerald, 2002). Intensified slave 
raiding was perpetrated by Government-backed militia as a tool of war to terrorize the 
population. Many villagers from Western Upper Nile have recounted sobering accounts 
of scores of relatives, including young children, brutally murdered by the GoS and its 
militias, abducted or lost in the chaos surrounding the attacks. One woman recalled that 
while hiding behind a tree during one attack, “a woman was running with her child. For a 
moment she let the child go…[and] a horseman swooped down on them and took the 
child. The mother has no idea what happened to her little child.”18  
 
The scale of the abductions and slavery is unknown, but is substantial. There has been 
much debate over the numbers and the status of those designated as “slaves”. The 
Sudanese government claims that as few as 5,000 people have suffered from inter-tribal 
abductions while some NGOs reckon that up to 200,000 have been enslaved19. The 
Jonglei Peace Conference in southern Upper Nile reported that 855 children had been 
abducted in the sub-region. Chief Cuei of Duk County recalled an incident in which an 
abducted child from Duk was returned only to be stolen again along with another child.20 
At the conference, participants enumerated over and over the numbers of children and 
women abducted and the trauma experienced by both children and parents. 
 
These patterns of violence also generate tremendous fear. Rumours of fighting and 
imminent attacks would cause people to leave their villages and hide in the bush often 
without access to food. As documented below, this has a knock-on effect on essential 
livelihood activities like planting. 
 
b) Displacement 
 
“We have to keep moving if we want to stay alive.” Chief Manyeil Kong 
 
War in southern Sudan has led to widespread displacement, both temporary and 
permanent. Sudan now has a larger IDP population than any other country in the world, a 
record four million according to the Global IDP project.  
 
                                                 
16 Conversation with David Deng, Yirol County, 22 July 2004. 
17 Duffield (2001: 228) comments that “inter-group abduction is an established feature of ethnic border zones…. It has 
long been part of the ‘traditional value systems’ of the groups involved”. 
18 Advocacy document distributed by DanChurchAid and Christian Aid. 
19 As reported in Deng, 2003: 122, quoting Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group. 
20 Murle Peace Committee, Boma Civil Administration, Pibor Development Association, “Jonglei Inter-Ethnic Peace & 
Reconciliation Conference Murle Led Peace Initiative,” 20-23 February 2004.  
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Temporary displacement, also known as seasonal displacement, often occurred during the 
dry season at critical times of planting and harvesting crops. Cattle raiding and even 
temporary displacement left families unable to access food inputs. As a result, they 
became increasingly vulnerable to malnutrition, disease and death.  
 
Sometimes this has occurred on a very large scale. For example, after the 1991 split in the 
SPLA and increased inter-tribal fighting, the UN reported that “more than 200,000 
residents of [the Dinka areas of Upper Nile], in an exodus unlike anything seen before in 
Sudan, fled south in search of food, shelter and security”21. Deliberate displacement was 
a key strategy in the GoS scorched-earth policy in oil-producing areas of Western Upper 
Nile as described below in section f). 
 
Large-scale displacement of southerners into northern Sudan, including Khartoum and 
South Darfur, provided a cheap and malleable labour force for commercial farmers and 
other members of the host communities, including local leaders. Exploitation of this large 
IDP – often Dinka – population has been rife and is quite well-documented (Duffield, 
2001). The international aid community’s failure to protect this population has been 
severely criticised (see Karim et al, 1996). 
  
Displaced families that were once considered wealthy are often reduced to relying on 
relatives or the charity of their host communities to survive. Kuany, for example, once a 
wealthy man with many wives and children, fled several times before finally ending up in 
Ler. “Ler is a better place. Our old village is a place of war. The GoS can shell my old 
village whenever they want.” Kuany lost all of his cattle during the attack and was left 
with nothing. He had to send two of his wives and seven of their children to relatives in 
Mayom County where they could be fed. Four of his wives, the mothers of his slain 
children, remained with him. Kuany has been reduced to relying on other displaced 
relatives for food.22
 
Internally displaced individuals such as Kuany are left with very few of the inputs needed 
to rebuild their lives. If they arrive too late for the planting season or lack the necessary 
tools for planting, then they will remain food insecure unless they can call upon relatives 
(see kinship support below), the host community or the international community 
intervenes to fill the hunger gap.  
 
The IDPs left in limbo, fleeing from place to place, are even less able to pick up and 
rebuild their lives until some measure of security returns. The story of Elizabeth Nyadet 
Joak illustrates the plight of IDPs as they are forced to move from place to place for 
security and survival. 
                                                 
21 Quoted in Deng, 2003: 125 
22 Ibid. 
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Elizabeth Nyadet Joak: ex-internally displaced  
person from Upper Nile23
 
Elizabeth Nyadet Joak is a Gawaar Nuer from Ayod County, Upper Nile. She is 
the mother of seven children and a widow whose husband was killed in action 
by the GoS in 1987.  Due to the fighting between the SPLA and the Sudanese 
People’s Defense Force (SPDF) in1992, followed by the 1998 Lou Nuer attack 
on Gawaar positions, Elizabeth and her family were displaced to the toich. After 
they lost their cattle to Lou Nuer raiders, the family moved to a village called 
Gaar where they spent two years.  
 
Life in the village was difficult for the family because they did not have access 
to clean drinking water or health facilities. The family heard that in a place 
called Jiech there were NGOs, which provided basic services, such as clean 
drinking water from the borehole and primary health care services. They also 
heard that NGOs distributed kits for the displaced, which contained basic 
household needs such as a mosquito net, blanket, cooking pots and fishing 
equipment. Since these were the things Elizabeth’s family needed for survival, 
they decided to move to Jiech in 1995.  
 
However, in Jiech, they were again subjected to frequent displacement to and 
from the toich because of fighting between SPLA and Government militia on the 
one hand and the Lou Nuer versus the Gawaar on the other. December 2002 
brought a peace settlement between the two Nuer clans of Gawaar and Lou 
under the auspices of the NSCC. Since then, there have not been any major 
incidents of one group attacking the other, except for small-scale robbery and 
cattle theft. 
  
At the outset of 2003, the original residents of Ayod decided to return home. 
Elizabeth’s family was among those who returned to Ayod in January 2004. 
Elizabeth now relies on trading; she brews and sells beer. She then buys grain 
and dry fish with the money she generates from trading. Elizabeth noted that her 
activities were much disrupted by the violence between the Gawaar and Lou 
Nuer. 
 
 
With the rise in localized conflict, IDPs have become increasingly vulnerable to banditry 
along the road. Displaced populations, some of them returning to their places of origin, 
have been robbed of all property, including cattle and cooking utensils. Deng Mading of 
Pact noted that you could find people walking with nothing but the clothes on their backs 
because all of their property had been stolen.24 Some groups have even used their meager 
incomes to hire people to protect them along the way. 
 
                                                 
23 Conversation with Elizabeth Nyadet Joak, Ayod County, 27 July 2004. 
24 Conversation with Deng Mading, Nairobi, Kenya, 31 August 2004. 
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Other problems arise when IDPs, particularly those individuals who have been displaced 
for a long time, attempt to return to their land. They find that it is now occupied or has 
been taken over by the SPLA. As an example, one woman, returning to Bahr el Ghazal 
from the north, found that an SPLA commander had taken over her land, so she could not 
retrieve it. Her father’s land had also been taken over by the SPLA. She was not eligible 
to receive food aid because, having just returned, she was not registered. Even if she had 
been registered, she would have only received a small ration of food.25  
 
These are just a few of the problems that IDPs face. Taken together, they work against 
allowing IDPs to recover from the shock that caused their displacement in the first place. 
 
IDPs and host communities 
In some areas, IDPs have experienced very few problems with their host communities. In 
other areas, however, an influx of IDPs has placed a strain on communities already 
suffering from food insecurity due to past GoS bombardment, militia activity or localized 
conflict. The Bor Dinka IDPs who fled to Equatoria present one example of the friction 
that can arise between IDPs and their host communities. Many Dinka Bor from Upper 
Nile fled to Equatoria during the 1991 Bor conflict. Since then, about 15,000-20,000 Bor 
IDPs have remained in Mundri County and surrounding areas.26 Their presence and that 
of their cattle have led to a deteriorating security situation as cattle have destroyed the 
host community’s crops. IDPs have also occupied revered shrines, forests, and water 
points and have been cited for lacking respect for the hosts’ culture, traditions and local 
authorities.  
 
The tensions have at times boiled over into conflict between the two groups. Equatorians 
have retaliated by killing cattle found to be eating crops. These acts have led to hatred, 
counter-retaliations, and tit-for-tat violence between the two communities. On both sides, 
economic assets vital to household food security were destroyed.  
 
c) Livestock 
 
Livestock has long been the mainstay of the pastoral and agro-pastoral economies of the 
Lakes sub-region and Upper Nile. The war, however, has had a devastating impact. As a 
result of the asset-stripping nature of the war, an estimated 40% of households in Bahr el 
Ghazal lost all of their cattle (Deng 2000). People in other areas became more reliant on 
producing their own food. In Ruweng County of Upper Nile, for example, following the 
Nuer raids of 1996 and 1997, the traditionally pastoralist Ngok Dinka switched to mainly 
agricultural activities as their herds were reduced by 75% (Annual Needs Assessment, 
Ruweng). 
 
It is not only through raiding that herds have been depleted. Insecurity has limited access 
to vital grazing areas and water points and disrupted access to major markets where cattle 
could be exchanged for goods or restocked (discussed in section 6.2). For example, 
conflict has often seriously disrupted seasonal migration. Pastoralists and agro-
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Pact/SPF. Proposal: Joint Team Project for the Repatriation of Bor IDPs and Cattle. 
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pastoralists, such as the Dinka and Nuer tribes, regularly migrate with their livestock to 
cattle camps in the toich or lowland grazing area during times of drought. During the dry 
season when there is not enough water to support planting, about 90-95% of families, 
including women and young children, move to the toich where they have access to water 
points, grazing land for cattle and milk, an indispensable source of nutrition for 
children.27 However, access to the toich can be cut off by the presence of GoS forces or 
ethnic conflict. When ethnic conflict flares, movement to the toich exposes people and 
their cattle to hostile tribal elements. This puts people’s lives in danger and exposes 
livestock to the risk of cattle raiding. Thus, as much as 50% of the population may be 
forced to remain behind to contend with the dry season or drought in the home area.28 
This unusually large proportion of the population puts unbearable stress on the scarce 
resources in the home area, in turn causing increased levels of food insecurity. Also, 
when communities lose the option of dry season cattle migration to the toich, tensions 
arise as they are forced to compete over increasingly scarce resources. This competition 
has often escalated into violent conflict, as was observed among the Lou, Jikany and 
Gawaar Nuer after the Dinka-Nuer split.  
 
The loss of cattle has major implications for poverty in the region. It means lower milk 
yields, as families are dependent on milk to sustain them through the “hunger gap” 
between planting seasons. Milk is also vital to the health and development of children 
under five providing them with the necessary resistance to disease. One villager from 
Rumbek explained that he lost all of his cattle in the war and has never been able to 
restock. He now farms instead of tending cattle. “My children are sick because they do 
not get enough milk. We need milk,” he complained.29  
 
In addition, loss of cattle leaves families with fewer assets with which to trade or barter 
for food and non-food items such as grain and fishing equipment. It also has implications 
for kinship support. As better off families lose livestock, they have less to loan out to 
poorer relatives to help them through the distress periods. Large-scale loss of animals 
takes away an important source of identity in this pastoralist society (Fielding and Sharp, 
2000). 
 
d) Agricultural production 
 
Conflict has targeted crop production in two ways: through the destruction of crops and 
the displacement of labour. In both Lakes and Upper Nile, looting crops and food stocks 
and then burning what was left behind was just one method of targeting the asset base of 
households. Crop production was further impacted when families were forced to flee and 
thus were not able to tend to sowing and harvesting crops. 
 
                                                 
27 Conversation with Steve McDowell, Nairobi, Kenya July 2004. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Conversation with villager from Rumbek County, 26 July 2004. 
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According to the 1997 SRRA assessment report (SRRA, 1997): 
 
Physical insecurity in southern Sudan continued to be a significant cause of food 
insecurity as it has eroded households’ entitlement base through serious 
economic disruption in agriculturally productive zones, decline in food 
production, food stocks and livestock looted.  
 
The impact of conflict on food security has not changed since the SRRA report of 1997. 
The conflict between the Pan Kuc and Pan Lual tribes in Tonj North County in 
2003/2004, for example, “disrupted economic activity,” causing “communities to stop 
cultivation for fear of ambush.”30 Similarly, conflict between the Gok and Agar tribes has 
seriously affected planting for the past two years. In Tonj North, harvests have been 
threatened by the escalation in violence between the Agurpiiny and Mayauai peoples. 
 
As James Awong, an Ngop Dinka from Yirol County summarized the predicament: “if 
you heard that there was fighting in Yirol, you’d be on the move, hiding in the bush. You 
never knew who would be stronger, the government or the SPLA, so you just had to go 
into hiding, without access to food and a lot of things.”31  When conflict threatens to 
erupt, households often have little choice but to flee for their lives, prioritizing security 
over production.  As a result, farmers are unable to harvest crops or tend to weeds and 
pests that might threaten the harvest.  
 
Permanent and temporary displacement has led families to expand on other food sources. 
Shifting to wildfoods was one coping strategy that families employed to buffer the asset-
stripping nature of the conflicts. People displaced from villages in Western Upper Nile, 
for example, were forced to scavenge for wild vegetables such as water lily to survive. 
When the water lily ran out, they were forced to move, walking for miles in search of 
wild foods that they had never before eaten. In Rumbek County, people recounted having 
to rely on roots and wildfruits during the famine of 1998, a direct result of the intense 
fighting that Bahr el Ghazal witnessed in 1997. 
 
e) Kinship support – all are vulnerable 
 
Kinship is a major part of life in southern Sudan and kinship support is particularly vital 
in times of need, as it is used as a coping mechanism to buffer the impact of external 
shocks such as conflict. The war, however, has had a deleterious impact on kinship 
support as it has separated families and has targeted assets so that wealthier households 
have less to give to poorer relatives.  
 
“Everyone is so scattered,” explained Rhoda Adel from Rumbek, when commenting on 
the lack of support she receives from her family32. Families were scattered by 
displacement as people were separated in the chaos of fleeing conflict or even as families 
chose to uproot themselves from insecure areas to settle elsewhere in southern Sudan and 
                                                 
30 Pact/SPF, Summary tables of Pankar Cluster Conflict Analysis. 
31 Conversation with Pantayar Khoucal, Yirol County, 20 July 2004. 
32 Conversation with Rhoda Adel, Rumbek, 23 July 2004. 
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abroad. Awut Acuil, and NSCC representative who is now a refugee in Kenya, noted that 
she was separated from her husband’s family and “they are now scattered all over the 
place.”33  
 
The asset-stripping nature of the conflict has also left wealthier households with little to 
share with poorer relatives. Deng (2003) has convincingly demonstrated how the non-
poor are more vulnerable to attack than the poorest in war. This is principally because 
they are targeted because they have more assets such as cultivated land, food stocks and 
cattle. He also claims that they are more susceptible to trauma and have greater 
inflexibility to adopt new livelihood strategies. This, in turn, has a knock-on effect: the 
poor are no longer able to call on their better-off relatives for help. 
 
                                Nuer-Nuer conflict in Eastern Upper Nile34
 
Nyuon Nen Nyuen, a Bul Nuer from Ayod County, Upper Nile who is a farmer and a 
former leader of the Bonum (White Army) recalled the fighting that broke out during 
the time when the Lou Nuer attacked the Gawaar and raided over 500 cattle. This 
attack marked the beginning of atrocities between the two Nuer factions and a big 
shift in the pattern of violence. Though cattle-raiding was previously only practiced 
between the Nuer and Dinka tribes, now Nuer were raiding the cattle of other Nuer. 
This attack led to subsequent retaliatory attacks lasting up until December 2002 
when the NSCC mediated a peace conference in Ayod in which the two sides agreed 
to stop fighting.  
 
Nyuon used to rely on livestock (cattle, shoats and chicken), grain, agriculture, and 
business for his family’s livelihood. However, all of these activities were affected by 
the fighting. He and his family were displaced, their cattle raided and their grain and 
other household belongings looted. Nyuon and his family had to leave their farm 
behind, first moving to Pagey village, then to Beu and then further to Panah village. 
He returned to Ayod in May 2004.  
 
 
Poorer households also rely on wealthier relatives for labour. However, this mechanism 
becomes limited in the presence of conflict. As better off households move away from 
the areas of conflict or disperse their livestock to more secure areas, the labour market 
collapses, negatively affecting poorer relatives. 
 
Kinship support as a percentage of the household food basket is often reported to be very 
low during periods of conflict. In Southern Leech State in Western Upper Nile, for 
example, during the period of intense fighting in the area between 1999 and 2001, 
reliance on kinship for food gradually fell from 9% in 1998 (still not that high) to 2% in 
2001 for poor households (ANA Southern Leech State). The situation was worse in 
Ruweng County as kinship support was reported to have fallen to 0% in 2001 as a result 
                                                 
33 Conversation with Awut Acuil, Yirol County, 19 July 2004. 
34 Conversation with Nyuon Nen Nyuen, Ayod County, 26 July 2004. 
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of fighting around the oil fields (ANA Ruweng)35. This is very likely the result of 
wealthier families having very little to give as well as wealthier families moving away 
from the conflict areas. 
 
f) The impact on women 
 
“Women had to find a way to win. They became breadwinners and the head of families. 
They were even taking care of extended families.” Awut Acuil 
 
“Women have lost both men and children. It’s really painful.” Rhoda Amuk 
 
The war has been especially hard on Sudanese women. Almost every adult woman in 
southern Sudan can narrate stories of fathers, husbands, sons and male relatives lost to the 
war. In 2000, a large gap was measured between the number of adult men and women in 
southern Sudan with women outnumbering men by a significant margin. In the Lakes 
Region, for instance, there were an estimated 166,223 men and 279,849 women. In Upper 
Nile there were an estimated 31, 372 adult men and 82, 234 women, a significant gap 
(See Annex 4).36
 
During the Lou-Jikany peace conference held in March 2004, women deplored the 
fighting that left them as widows. Mary Nyabiel Cuil, a Jikany women’s representative, 
stressed that women were traumatized to see their husbands and children being killed like 
animals. Widows were left with the unbearable responsibility of taking care of orphans. 
She noted that the internal displacement of people have left women exposed to all manner 
of humiliations and violations.37 Women do not have land rights; everything belongs to 
the family. When a man dies, his wife is inherited by one of his brothers. 
 
In this patriarchal Sudanese society, widow-headed households have become some of the 
poorest in the region. In 2000 in Yirol County, for example, 15-25% of poor households 
were headed by widows, while 20-30% of the poorest households were headed by 
widows; there were virtually no widow-headed households in the middle and better-off 
economic categories (See Annex 4).38  
 
Women who have lost husbands and sons to the war have been forced to take on almost 
all livelihood activities, from collecting grass and cutting wood to building tukuls (grass 
huts), walking long distances with children on their backs to collect wild foods and relief 
food, sowing and cultivating in the fields, brewing and selling local beer and trading 
goods in the markets. Women in Yirol County complain that in the past, you would not 
see women doing this kind of “men’s work”. “Before the war, men would cut the poles 
for constructing a house. Now women have to do it all because no one else will do it for 
you.”39 Some have commented on how the increased domestic burden on women has 
                                                 
35 See Annex 3 for ANA data regarding kinship support contribution to the total food basket during these years. 
36 Unicef, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2000. 
37 Africa Center for Human Advocacy (ACHA) “A Report on Jikany/Lou Peace Conference,” Riang Location, Eastern 
Upper Nile, 1-5 March 2004. 
38 WFP, Annual Needs Assessment, Yirol County, 2000-2001. 
39 Conversation with Elizabeth Yar Malek (from Bor), Yirol County, 25 July 2004. 
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become more or less institutionalised even when men have returned.40 Nyandeng Malek, 
a Community Development Officer for Pact, attributed this disparity to the impact of the 
war: 
 
Men became accustomed to going to Ethiopia and other camps to train to be 
soldiers. They’re used to fighting. They now consider themselves townspeople 
so they don’t want to work or farm. So all the work falls to women. This is why 
you see women working and men loafing. This is a result of years and decades 
of war.41
 
g) Oil extraction – the impact of a scorched earth policy 
 
“They want our land so that they can get the oil. They do not want southerners to remain 
on their land.” Chepak Theaf Kac 
 
One of the most devastating cases of the destruction of livelihoods, displacement and 
impoverishment on an appalling scale has happened in the areas surrounding the oil fields 
in Western Upper Nile. Through a well-documented scorched-earth policy, the 
government attempted to completely depopulate the areas surrounding the oil fields and 
along the path of the planned oil pipeline to the Red Sea. Oil exploration was made 
possible by using the murahalin to clear away all civilian populations and then to secure 
these areas through alliances with the breakaway Nuer factions of the SPLA (Johnson, 
2003).  
 
According to a report by Christian Aid, government forces and militias unleashed in the 
area destroyed harvests, looted livestock and burned houses to ensure that no one would 
ever return home. In one area, government officials warned people to move before they 
attacked, stating: “We don’t want anybody here. This is not your place anymore! We 
have business to do here.” (Christian Aid, 2001)  
 
A woman from Ngaryang village recalled that her village had been bombed several times. 
When this happened, she and her family fled to the forest. “The fighting had intensified 
with helicopter gunships and horsemen. The Antonov bombed while the gunships shot at 
us.” The gunships also fired rockets at the tukuls to set them on fire. Before long, the 
village was set ablaze and filled with smoke. Then the GoS sent in horsemen and tanks. 
Chaos reigned. Villagers ran everywhere in search of safety.42
 
Many of those interviewed by Christian Aid repeated such tales of the Government using 
Antonov bombing to scatter people and then bringing in helicopters and truckloads of 
GoS soldiers to raze whole villages and to shoot everyone in sight.  Specific events cited 
by Christian Aid vividly portray the northern-backed forces’ merciless sweep of the area:  
 
                                                 
40 Conversation with  Rhoda Amuk, Rumbek County, 23 July 2004. 
41 Conversation with Nyandeng Malek, Yirol County, 18 July 2004. 
42 Advocacy document distributed by DanChurchAid and Christian Aid.  
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An estimated 11,000 people displaced from Block 5a by the … attacks settled in 
the SPLA-controlled village of Nhialdiu. The village was already swollen by 
Nuer who had been driven south from the Heglig area in earlier years. Then on 
15 July 2000, government militias attacked Nhialdiu, burning every hut bar one 
and displacing every inhabitant. A local chief, John Lou, said that the militias 
rounded up the elderly, put them in one hut and burned them alive. He said some 
of the dead were also very young children—five of them his own children 
(Christian Aid, 2001). 
6.2  Meso level 
 
a) Social infrastructure 
 
Two decades of war have had a crippling impact on social infrastructure. Several 
generations have grown up with little or no access to formal education. Children in areas 
of southern Sudan controlled by the SPLA are thought to have the least access to primary 
education anywhere in the world with a net enrolment ratio into primary schools of 
around 20%. In terms of primary school completion, it has the lowest rate in the world, 
i.e., an estimated 2%. Adult illiteracy (76%) is second only to Niger. Adult female 
illiteracy and youth illiteracy rates are estimated to be 88% and 31%, respectively. There 
are only 1,600 schools for approximately 1.6 million children of school age (NSCSE & 
UNICEF, 2004). 
 
Men (and some women) are now soldiers or former soldiers instead of secondary school 
or college graduates. This causes serious shortcomings in human capacity. Those who 
were lawyers and junior judges before the war are now responsible for overseeing the 
administration of justice, despite having not practiced law in Sudan for some twenty 
years. Even worse, there are only 30-40 judges and about the same number of lawyers for 
all of south Sudan, a territory as large as Germany and France combined, or roughly the 
size of Texas in the United States. This lack of educated professionals simply extends the 
governance problems described above even though the war has subsided. 
 
Indeed, the general attitude of the SPLM/A and the other southern rebel factions toward 
building institutions of any kind is summed up in the words of one former soldier from 
Rumbek: “They say you go fight now. Once Sudan is liberated and there is peace, then 
you’ll go to school.”43 All development objectives were subordinated to the military 
cause. In the words of Keer Bol, a Regional Officer for Pact, “the SPLA was not 
interested in providing public services. This would have diverted resources from the war 
effort.”44
 
International aid has supported schools and health centres, but on a small scale compared 
with need, and this assistance could easily be disrupted by insecurity and lack of access 
(see section e below). 
 
                                                 
43 Conversation with Acuil, former soldier, Rumbek County, 23 July 2004. 
44 Conversation with Keer Bol, Rumbek County, 26 July 2004. 
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b) Taxation 
 
Taxation, to support the SPLA war effort, has been a serious drain on already strained 
household resources. People living in SPLA-held areas were called upon to contribute 
taxes, in the form of bulls and grain, to feed the soldiers. “Each family has contributed 
bulls for the war effort, whether voluntarily or forcefully. This is your livelihood and you 
can’t get it back,” explained Isaiah Alier of Rumbek.45 Taxation in the absence of 
functional governance can become particularly punitive as people are taxed again and 
again without any form of redress. For example, along trade routes from Uganda to 
Rumbek, people are taxed over and over because everyone wants their cut. During the 
war, when the call went out that the SPLA needed more soldiers, families were even 
expected to give up their children. Boys as young as nine years were forcefully recruited 
and sent to training camps in Ethiopia and other parts of the south.  
 
c) Trade and exchange 
 
In southern Sudan “trade” is not based on monetary transactions and “exchange” involves 
bartering goods such as cattle for grain or goods for services such as labour for grain. In a 
cashless economy, or where there is low circulation of currency, households principally 
depend upon exchange.  
 
In discussing the importance of trade and exchange in Upper Nile, Fielding and Sharp 
(2000) note that:  
Prior to the war, cattle for grain exchange took place every year, normally when 
the cattle returned from the toich at the start of the agricultural season. 
Exchanges were made either at the toich, where there was good access to 
producers living in the Nile Corridor food economy area or at the market 
centers. Major centers for exchange included Malakal and towns on the Juba-
Malakal road such as Atar and Kongor. Grain was brought from Renk and Kosti 
into Malakal, where cattle and tobacco could be sold at market centers. Tobacco 
was also taken to the southern border of the Nuer area to be traded with the 
Murle.  
 
In the Lakes sub-region, households would obtain cash by selling cattle and then use that 
money to buy grain from traders in the main markets of Rumbek, Thiet, Tonj, and Yirol. 
 
Conflict has severely limited these traditional trade and exchange patterns by limiting 
access to traders and markets. For example, fighting in Upper Nile in 1999 rendered the 
important market in Mankien inaccessible to Twic County in Bahr el Ghazal. Similarly, 
insecurity has completely isolated Ruweng County from external trade leaving families 
with no option to replenish vital food and non-food items, such as livestock, grain and 
fishing tools.  
 
The inter- and intra-ethnic conflict within the south also cut off relations between 
neighbours that historically traded with each other, like the Murle, Lou and Jikany Nuer 
                                                 
45 Conversation with Isaiah Alier, Rumbek County, 22 July 2004. 
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and the Dinka and Nuer. When the Lou Nuer were cut off from trade, a vital coping 
mechanism, they ended up attacking their Jikany and Gawaar neighbours for access to 
resources. 
 
This loss of trade severely impacts on livelihood coping strategies particularly in times of 
distress when pastoralists and agro-pastoralists would either sell livestock for money to 
buy food and non-food items or barter for them. Also, the conflict and looting has left 
poor households with almost nothing to trade. When trade or exchange does take place, it 
is often on poor terms to the detriment of livelihood systems46. 
 
d) Lack of access to humanitarian assistance 
 
During the civil war most international aid provided to southern Sudan has been 
humanitarian. Lack of access to those most in need has been a recurrent issue. Indeed, 
this was at the heart of the creation of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which legitimised 
the cross-border relief operation from Kenya.47  
 
Access has either been constrained because of violence and insecurity or as a deliberate 
strategy of war. As an example of the former, in June 1998 relief agencies had to pull out 
of Western Upper Nile because of fighting. Yet people were facing acute food insecurity 
to the point of famine. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) had to abandon its life-saving 
therapeutic and supplementary feeding programme for 750 children. We can assume that 
lives may have been lost as a result. MSF and other agency compounds were looted. 
 
There are numerous examples of how access to relief agencies has been denied often by 
the GoS. The most notorious denial of access occurred in the months preceding the Bahr 
el Ghazal famine in 1998, which undoubtedly contributed to the scale of the famine (See 
section 6.5 below). Denial of access by the GoS has since continued. In 2002 IRIN 
reported that up to 45 locations were at times off-limits. This is yet another example of 
the deliberate targeting of civilians, in terms of denial of access to basic life-saving relief, 
as part of the war strategy. 
6.3 Macro level 
 
At the macro level, two decades of civil war have been an enormous drain on the 
Sudanese economy in the north and the south, alike. At one time, in the early 1990s, it 
was estimated that the GoS was spending approximately $1 million a day on the war. 
Over time their strategy of counter-insurgency of divide-and-rule by arming the 
murahalin and southern militias became “war on the cheap”, a way of weakening the 
SPLA without undue expenditure on the northern Sudanese army and government money 
(Deng, 2003). Consistent with this strategy, Deng estimates that: 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Initially OLS was an ad hoc and informal tripartite agreement forged in 1989 between the GoS, the rebel movements 
in the south (specifically the SPLA and the SSIM) and the UN, for a discrete period of time, to improve humanitarian 
access to all war-affected populations. In 1994 it was formalised and the geographical focus was broadened. This 
agreement has been central to the humanitarian response ever since. 
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“the cost of the civil war on livelihoods in the south that is attributed to the 
activities of southern militias or south-south conflict is significantly higher than is 
the cost directly inflicted by the central government army”. 
(ibid: 123)  
6.4 The worst case scenario: conflict-induced famine 
 
Within a decade there have been at least three famines in southern Sudan, all conflict-
induced. The first was in Bahr El Ghazal in 1988, as a consequence of combined conflict 
and drought. It is estimated that almost 300,000 people lost their lives. The second was in 
1992-93, in Upper Nile, shortly after the split in the SPLA, which was marked by 
ferocious fighting between the divided southern movements. 
 
The third famine in 1998 was perhaps the most severe one once again in Bahr el Ghazal. 
In the worst famine months of June to August 1998, malnutrition and mortality rates were 
amongst the highest ever recorded. For example, in Ajiep, one of the worst-affected 
towns where 90% of the population had been displaced, the crude mortality rate was 
estimated at 69 per 10,000 per day and the under-five mortality rates at 133 per 10,000 
per day. Although these rates may be overestimated because of difficulties of estimating 
family size and because of the concentration of mortality in a few sites, we can still 
conclude that “these rates are staggeringly high, unheard of in civilian populations” 
(Buchanan-Smith et al, 1999:85). The total number of people who perished in this famine 
is unknown. Although the region had experienced three successive dry years, it was the 
effect of violent conflict that really triggered the 1998 famine in the following ways: 
(i) between 1995 and 1997, the notorious warlord, Kerubino, consistently attacked 
villages in northern Bahr el Ghazal (as described above), impoverishing them and 
leaving them highly vulnerable; 
 
(ii) in 1997, there was a fundamental shift in the war economy of Bahr el Ghazal when 
the SPLA made military advances, driving government troops out of places like 
Torrit. Trading relationships between garrisons and the local population collapsed, 
which deprived the latter of a key source of livelihood; 
 
(iii) when Kerubino defected to the SPLA in late 97/ early 98, there followed attacks on 
three garrison towns: Wau, Gogrial and Aweil. This caused massive displacement, 
of around 130,000 people, from towns into rural areas which were already facing 
acute food insecurity; 
 
(iv) just when the food security situation became cataclysmic, the GoS imposed a ban 
on all relief flights in early February 1998, only partially lifted in early March: 
“The ban could not be justified as of immediate military necessity and went far 
beyond the geographical areas of the brief fighting, in violation of customary rules 
of war. It was imposed to punish Kerubino, the SPLA, and the civilians living in 
areas they controlled” (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 3). 
(v) when the ban was partially lifted, relief flights were only allowed into four sites in 
SPLA-held territory and to the Government-held towns of Wau and Aweil. This 
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created a fatal magnet effect on an already highly stressed population. The 
concentration of people resulted in increased transmission of disease, and rocketing 
mortality. (Buchanan-Smith, 2003) 
6.5 Regional & international levels 
 
Some of the negative impacts of civil war in southern Sudan spill over into neighbouring 
countries in the form of arms flows, unchecked cattle raiding and the draining effect of 
warlordism. The case study of northern Kenya highlights some of these negative impacts 
(Buchanan-Smith and Lind, 2004). 
 
7. Overall impact on poverty, and patterns of recovery 
7.1 The general picture 
 
All over southern Sudan, the conflict has targeted assets and livelihoods, as part of the 
classic counter-insurgency strategy of “draining the water to catch the fish” (Deng, 2003). 
The impact has been high food insecurity, widespread displacement and death on a very 
substantial scale, not least because of the duration of the war. 
 
According to a recent publication, areas of southern Sudan controlled by the SPLA have 
some of the worst human development indicators in the world, which are substantially 
lower than other parts of Sudan. For example, the percentage of under-five children 
suffering from wasting (21.5%) is estimated to be the highest in the world. Children in 
these areas of southern Sudan are three times more likely to die than in other parts of 
Sudan and the maternal mortality ratio is three times the rest of Sudan. Gross national 
income per capita is estimated to be less than $90 per year, i.e., about four times lower 
than the income level in the rest of the country (NSCSE & UNICEF, 2004). 
7.2 Explaining differential impact 
 
Although there are strong similarities in the way that armed violence has impacted on 
households in the two focus areas of the Lakes sub-region of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper 
Nile region, as described in section 6 above, there are real differences in intensity. The 
conflicts raging in Upper Nile have had a much more deleterious impact on the civilian 
population. The reasons for this are the differing nature and scale of the conflicts in each 
region and differences in governance. Both of these factors have great implications for 
the process of recovery. 
 
As discussed earlier, the Lakes Region suffered from more conventional warfare with the 
GoS up until about 1997 when the SPLA took over. With this type of war, people 
generally knew where the fighting was taking place and could avoid it. In Upper Nile, 
however, with the mix of fighting (GoS bombardment in one area, GoS-backed militia 
activity in another area, inter-factional fighting in yet another area and Dinka-Nuer 
fighting in other areas), it was difficult to know where to run, as security or chaos in a 
particular area was never guaranteed, especially for the displaced. 
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Thus, Upper Nile experienced more wide-spread population displacement. The pockets of 
insecurity all over the region left people running from place to place for years in search of 
security, as Elizabet Nyadet Joak experienced (see earlier). This pattern of displacement 
does not allow households to recover easily and rebuild their lives. Fortunately, Elizabeth 
was finally able to return home and resume her life, although after six years of continuous 
displacements. Other people will be forever displaced as their villages were completely 
wiped out. 
 
GoS arming of militias was even more determined in Upper Nile than in the Lakes 
Region. This spurred inter-factional fighting and encouraged groups to carry traditional 
ethnic rivalries and competition over resources to new proportions of death and 
destruction through cattle raiding, looting, and general devastation of livelihoods.  
  
As well as differences in the nature and scale of the conflicts in the two regions, the 
presence or absence of governance structures finally tips the balance in explaining the 
differential impact and recovery patterns. The Lakes Region had a central authority and 
an attempt at the rule of law, whereas the Upper Nile Region had none. The experience of 
the Lakes Region shows that any system, even a centralized military authority such as the 
SPLA, is better than no authority. Despite the military’s record of delivering harsh and 
arbitrary judgments, the SPLA was reportedly effective for a time in keeping localized 
conflict in check. Although it undermined the authority of traditional chiefs, the SPLA 
kept the system of courts and customary law in place to hear cases and pass judgments. 
Though still at a nascent stage and rife with corruption, there are at least civil structures 
of governance in place. By comparison, the sheer amount of inter-factional, inter- and 
intra-ethnic conflict in Upper Nile meant that there was no kind of unified leadership, 
much less a system of rule of law that could be developed. The reigning chaos kept tribes 
and clans utterly divided. During the Wunlit II peace conference, participants cited over 
and over how the absence of central authority and rule of law in Upper Nile added to the 
resurgence of conflict. “Now there is no authority from Upper Nile because of 
insecurity…that is why we don’t have schools,” noted Thomas Gatot Chok, a youth from 
Western Upper Nile. Other conference participants noted that while there were a lot of 
commissioners in Upper Nile, there was absolutely no effective governance. As a result, 
this region has had a much harder time recovering after violent conflict.  
 
A look at the number of cattle owned and feddans cultivated per household in Upper Nile 
and Lakes regions illustrates this contrast in recovery patterns. When 1997 to 2002 
figures are compared to baseline data for the two livelihood zones, the numbers for Upper 
Nile are generally below average, while the numbers for Lakes Region are not only above 
average but tend to display a yearly increase in both the feddans cultivated and cattle 
owned.  The phenomenon of a yearly increase in the number of feddans cultivated in the 
Lakes Region is a direct result of the general security that the region has experienced. 
Households are more likely to devote labour to cultivation when there is less risk of 
losing the harvest. 
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7.3 Changing livelihood patterns? 
 
The recovery in livestock numbers since there has been relative security in parts of 
southern Sudan is remarkable (See Annex 5). It also appears that livestock holding is 
more evenly dispersed with more cattle in middle-income groups and less in wealthier 
groups.  
 
However, the extent to which some households that have lost all their livestock will be 
able to return to pastoralism or agro-pastoralism is a moot point. This is particularly the 
case for the large number of female-headed households and for poorer socio-economic 
groups. Although agricultural production is the obvious alternative to herding, for them 
labour is a big issue especially for women who have to care for children and for all the 
other domestic chores. Also, as long as there is the threat of insecurity, cropping is a very 
risky livelihood strategy. Conflict may prevent time-sensitive weeding and ground 
preparation and the crops themselves are vulnerable to being destroyed. Instead, some of 
the poorest people are resorting to petty trading, fishing and wildfoods. These shifts in the 
livelihood base may prove to be irreversible and leave marginalised groups ever more 
vulnerable particularly if they have weak social links to the community. 
 
8 Implications for aid programming 
8.1 Learning from the Wunlit Peace Covenant 
 
The 1999 Wunlit Peace Covenant effectively ended seven and a half years of politicized 
inter-tribal fighting between the Dinka and Nuer tribes, which had begun with the SPLA 
split in 1991. It covered a large geographical area, i.e., part of eastern Bahr el Ghazal and 
part of Western Upper Nile.48 This local-level agreement helped to restore trust between 
the Nuer and Dinka tribes and provided relative security. It has become a model for local 
level people-to-people peace processes, but also illustrates how recovery is hampered 
when underlying sources of conflict are not addressed.  
After a lengthy process of traditional conflict resolution, through indigenous traditions of 
airing grievances, story-telling and cleansing rituals, the Wunlit peace covenant was 
signed by all parties in Wunlit in Bahr el Ghazal’s Tonj County. It was brokered by the 
NSCC. The effects were immediate:   
• cross-border cattle rustling, while it did not completely cease, declined dramatically; 
• internal and cross-border regional trade resumed. Thousands of Dinka traders traveled 
from Yirol County to Nuer areas of Nyal, Ganyiel and other locations to pick up 
relations, trade and commercial activities. As a result, many heads of cattle were sold 
from Western Upper Nile/Unity State through Dinkaland to Uganda later that year 
                                                 
48 The areas included in the Wunlit agreement, referred to as the Wunlit cluster, cover the Dinka zone in the Lakes sub-
region of eastern Bahr el Ghazal, from Gogrial County in the north-east to Yirol County, while the Nuer zone stretches 
from Mayom in the north-west to Payinjiar County in the south west area of Western Upper Nile. 
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(NSCC, 2002). Rumbek County authorities  later established cross-border trade 
between Rumbek and counties in Western Upper Nile; 
• the relative security that followed the peace agreement also allowed for surplus grains 
in parts of the region, which helped to enhance exchange activities; 
• pastures were consecrated for joint use and hundreds of displaced returned to their old 
homes along the border, well in advance of any relief that would enable them to begin 
rebuilding;  
• several abducted women and children were returned;  
• Nuer fleeing from GoS bombardment around the oil areas even sought refuge in 
Dinka lands, something that they would not have done before Wunlit. 
This illustrates the effect of security in reversing some of the impoverishing factors 
associated with war and violence, above all ending the asset-stripping nature of violent 
conflict. 
Wunlit was most successful in restoring trust between the Dinka and Nuer 
communities and thus in ending the politicized inter-tribal clashes. However, there 
continued to be sporadic violations of the Wunlit agreement, most instigated by outside 
forces, such as the GoS-backed militia groups on the East and West banks that were 
intent on destroying the peace. Weak governance and rule of law were cited as the major 
sources of the re-emergence of conflict. Many of the resolutions from Wunlit I involving 
governance and rule of law were not implemented as evident in these examples. In some 
areas border police were not put in place, while there was a lack of any kind of effective 
governance in Western Upper Nile. Also, sometimes SPLA and government officials 
were seen to be complicit in criminal activity and undisciplined SPLA soldiers were 
causing problems. As a result, conflicts that erupted were not resolved properly, which 
led to retaliation and an escalation of fighting.  
The lesson of Wunlit is two-fold. It shows the importance of restoring trust in a society to 
re-establish security and to mitigate the impoverishing impact of war. At the same time, 
the Wunlit experience shows that communities can easily relapse into conflict when the 
underlying causes of conflict are not addressed.  These causes include external political 
influences, the proliferation of weapons and weak governance and rule of law. These 
very issues have tipped the balance in Upper Nile where conflict still rages despite the 
official cessation in hostilities: this situation is hampering recovery. 
8.2  Building recovery and development out of peace 
 
Programming must be integrated to combine investment in development (e.g., in water, 
health and education) with investment in governance (e.g., in the police, judiciary and 
protection). Failure to address the latter will almost certainly result in a waste of 
resources in the former. This is one of the very real challenges facing southern Sudan 
today. 
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8.3  Avoid disarmament programmes in isolation 
 
There are various examples of unsuccessful attempts at disarmament in southern Sudan, 
including the disarmament programme that took place in the Lakes Region in 2000. 
There was confusion as to who to disarm and who to leave with arms only to result in an 
ineffective piecemeal approach. Dinka bordering Nuer were left with arms to patrol 
themselves, but people in the interior were disarmed. This was singularly unsuccessful 
because arms were still coming back into the area from Upper Nile. Moreover, there was 
corruption and thus those who were disarmed could retrieve their guns by buying them 
back from the SPLA. Others would keep arms with their relatives and still others broke 
into the stores where guns were kept because they felt vulnerable and needed the guns to 
protect themselves.  
 
This experience reveals the folly of disarming before security is guaranteed and before 
local people trust the governance systems. Currently, the possession of weapons is 
regarded as an essential part of people’s livelihood strategies to protect themselves. Real 
investment in disarmament is only worthwhile much further down the line when there is a 
track record of improved governance and security. 
8.4  Implications for aid donors  
 
In the short term, the international community must: 
 
• continue to actively support the peace agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A;  
• use advocacy to end militia activity and external manipulation and instigation of war 
in the south; 
• support local-level people-to-people peace processes to settle disputes, reconcile 
communities and restore trust; 
• support efforts to address conflicts over scarce resources, i.e. land and water; 
• seek buy-in from SPLM/A and local authorities to settle outstanding disputes. 
 
In the longer term, the international community must work to: 
• build local, regional, and national capacity for effective governance; 
• strengthen the rule of law (police, judiciary, courts, judges and lawyers); 
• establish mechanisms of accountability for positions of authority, such as 
commissioners, judges, soldiers, commanders, etc.; 
• develop strategies to address the concerns of marginalized groups; and, 
• link disarmament plans to longer-term rehabilitation and recovery.   
 
Although this second list may be directed at the longer-term, it needs to start 
immediately, in particular to address issues of governance. Ultimately, the only 
sustainable way to reduce poverty in these regions will be to reduce violent conflict, as it 
is more than two decades of a brutal civil war that have so desperately impoverished the 
population. 
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Acronyms 
 
ANA    Annual Needs Assessment 
BEG    Bahr El Ghazal 
CBO    community based organisation 
CICS    Centre for International Cooperation and Security,  
University of Bradford 
DFID    UK Department for International Development 
GoS    Government of Sudan 
IDP    internally displaced person 
IDS    Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University 
IGAD    Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
MSF    Medecins Sans Frontieres 
NGO    non governmental organisation 
NSCC    New Sudan Council of Churches 
NSCSE   New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation 
OLS    Operation Lifeline Sudan 
PDF    Popular Defence Forces 
SC-UK   Save the Children UK 
SPF    Sudan Peace Fund 
SPLM/A   Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army 
SRRA    Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association 
SSIM/A   Southern Sudan Independence Movement/ Army 
SSUM    South Sudan Unity Movement 
WFP    World Food Programme 
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Annex 1: List of people interviewed 
 
Paul Murphy   Pact 
Simon Richards  Pact 
Paul Savage   Pact 
Keer Bol   Pact 
Deng Mading   Pact 
Nyandeng Malek  Pact 
Awut Acuil   Pact 
Buzz Sharp    SC-UK 
Wendy Fenton   SC-UK 
Steve McDowell  WFP 
Adele Sowinska  Catholic Relief Services 
Luka Biong Deng  NSCSE 
Maker Ayuel Deng  NSCSE 
James Kok   SPLM 
Caroline Gullick  USAID consultant 
Jason Matus   USAID consultant 
Will Mulders   Verification Monitoring Team, Bahr el Ghazal 
Suzanne Jambo  New Sudanese Indigenous NGOs Network 
Alice Hinga   DFID 
Rachel Sisk   DFID/ Foreign & Commonwealth Office (UK) 
Dan Maxwell   CARE 
Gary McGurk   CARE 
Tim Mander   CARE  
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Annex 2: Maps of Southern Sudan 
 
 
 
 
Note: Map ANA 2001/2002 
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 Map of Lakes sub-region of Bahr el Ghazal49  
 
  
                                                 
49 Map taken from the Pact/SPF Pankar Rapid Response Proposal. Pankar Cluster refers to the Lakes Region. 
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Map of Upper Nile Region 
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 Oil Activity and the Scene of War in Western Upper Nile,  
As of October 31, 200250  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Sudan, Oil and Human Rights,”  
www.hrw.org/reports/ 2003/sudan1103/3.htm
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Annex 3: Food Baskets for Ruweng County and Southern Leech 
State 
 
Food Basket for Ruweng County 1999 and 2001 
 
Poor Non poor Food Basket/Year 
‘99 ‘01 ‘99 ‘01 
Crop 7.5 2.5 11.5 7.5
Exchange 0 0 10.5 0
Fish 11 7.5 21 9
Kinship 1 0 0 0
Livestock 0 4 27 11.5
Hunting 3 0 1.5 0
Wildfoods 45 17.5 11 12.5
Deficit (-) -32.5 -68.5 -17.5 -59.5 
Note: ANA Data 
 
Food Basket for Southern Leech State 1998-2002 
 
Poor Non poor Food Basket/Year 
‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 
Crops 9 16 28 16 19 18 21 32 43 27 
Exchange 4 2 6 5 7 7 2 4 7 12 
Fish 21 20 27 30 27 16 16 30 20 18 
Kinship 9 5 3 2 8 3 3 0 0 7 
Livestock 17 22 4 1 5 33 33 25 22 16 
Wildfoods 22 17 26 30 20 16 21 14 15 16 
Relief N/A 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Deficit (-) 
-19 -19 -7 -15 -14 -6 -1 6 8 -2 
Note: ANA Data 
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Annex 4: Women in southern Sudan 
 
The following table shows the disparity between the numbers of adult men and women in 
Bahr el-Ghazal, the Lakes sub-region of Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile Region. 
 
Disaggregated population data for Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile 
  
Adult Population Total Population  
(including adults and 
children) 
Region/Gender 
Men Women Men  Women 
Bahr el Ghazal 186,256 549,836 809,971 1,067,856 
Lakes sub-region of Bahr el 
Ghazal 
166,223 279,849 450,469 523,082 
Upper Nile 31,372 82,234 143,764 178,769 
Unicef, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2000 
 
The following table shows the socio-economic breakdown for widow-headed households 
as compared to households in which both a man and a woman were present in Yirol 
County in 2002. Widowed households disproportionately fell in the poor and poorest 
socio-economic categories. 
 
Socio-economic breakdown for households in Yirol County 2000   
 
Socioeconomic Breakdown    Poorest Poor Middle Better Off 
% Female based households 15-20 25-35 30-40 15-20 
No. of Wives 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 
% Widowed hh 20-30 15-25 0 0 
Land (feddans) /hh 0.5-1 2-3 3-4 3-4 
Assets-Cattle/male hh* 0-5 15-25 50-70 100-200 
Assets-Shoats/male hh 0-10 20-30 40-50 10-20 
     
 ANA, Yirol, 2000/2001 
  
 
Annex 5: Livestock numbers 
 
South Bor, Southern Upper Nile 
 
Cattle Population Per Household 
1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 
15,128 46,306 14,609 79,053 79,053
54,935 205,611 39,814 129,360 129,360
79,134 110,650 82,761 129,360 129,360
149,197 362,567 137,184 337,773 337,773
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